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In this paper, we model the economic incentives surrounding opium crop 
production  at  farm  level  in  Afghanistan.  Specifically,  we  examine  the 
impact of eradication policies when opium is used as a means of obtaining 
credit, and when the crops are produced in sharecropping arrangements. 
The  theoretical  analysis  suggests  that  when  perfect  credit  markets  are 
available, an increased risk of having the opium poppy eradicated will lead 
to less land being allocated to opium poppy. Thus, with perfect credit 
markets, the  eradication  policy  is  likely  to have  the  intended  effect  of 
lowering  opium  crop  production.  However,  when  opium  is  sold  on 
futures  markets  as  a  means  of  obtaining  credit,  the  effects  of  opium 
eradication  are  no  longer  clear-cut:  in  some  cases  the  outcome  may 
actually increase the land allocated to opium poppy. Finally, the results 
indicate  that  when  opium  is  produced  in  sharecropping  arrangements, 
increased risk of opium eradication will unambiguously make the tenants 
worse off, while landlords may actually benefit. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Today, Afghanistan is practically the only producer of opium in the world. 
In  2008,  Afghanistan  accounted  for  92%  of  the  world‟s  opium 
production, and was valued at a third of Afghanistan‟s licit gross domestic 
product (GDP) (UNODC, 2008). The high level of production has been 
of international concern not only due to the health problems related to its 
usage,  but  also  due  to  its  contribution  to  insecurity,  instability,  and 
corruption,  both  within  and  beyond  Afghanistan‟s  borders  (Clemens, 
2007). An important part of the counternarcotic strategy to combat the 
production  of  opium  in  Afghanistan  has  been  eradication  of  opium 
poppy.  However,  eradication  of  opium  poppy  is  highly  controversial. 
Advocates  argue  that  a  credible  threat  of  eradication  is  necessary  for 
farmers and landowners to refrain from opium cultivation, while critics 
argue  that  eradication  is  inefficient  and  often  even  counterproductive 
(Blanchard, 2009). In addition, eradication often targets poor farmers who 
have few alternative sources of income. Indeed, the questionable success 
of eradication strategies calls for a closer examination of the economic 
incentives that are at play at farm level in the Afghan opium industry. Are 
there factors in the market structure surrounding opium crop production 
that affects the outcome of the eradication policies and cause the usual 
assumption  of  increased  risk  of  eradication  –  lower  levels  of  crop 
production – to be unfounded? 
 
In this paper, we consider two features that have been associated with 
Afghan opium crop production (Mansfield, 2003): 2  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
  That opium can be used as a means of obtaining credit through 
sales on futures markets, and 
  That the crops often are produced in sharecropping arrangements. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model to understand 
whether and, if so, how these circumstances can affect the outcome of 
opium eradication policies. 
 
The reason for studying the effects of eradication under different credit 
and  land  tenure  systems  is  that  the  formation  of  these  systems  in 
Afghanistan often differs from the perfect credit and land rental markets 
that  are  usually  assumed  when  evaluating  economic  policy.  In 
Afghanistan,  as  is  often  the  case  in  areas  where  the  environment  is 
inherently  risky  and  formal  credit  and  insurance  markets  are  limited, 
informal  credit  systems  and  sharecropping  arrangements  have  become 
integral  parts  of  the  rural  economy.  In  these  credit  and  land  rental 
systems, the opium poppy has, due to its favourable characteristics, come 
to play an important role both as a means of obtaining credit through 
sales  on  futures  markets,  and  as  a  means  to  obtain  land  through 
sharecropping  arrangements.  It  has  been  widely  recognised  that  these 
roles are likely to influence the choice of what crops to cultivate (see e.g. 
Mansfield, 2003). However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been 
no  attempt  to  launch  an  in-depth  investigation  on  the  underlying 
mechanisms of how and when these circumstances affect the outcome of 
opium eradication.  
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The theoretical analysis presented in this paper suggests that, when perfect 
credit markets are available, an increased risk of having the opium poppy 
eradicated  will  lead  to  less  land  being  allocated  to  opium  poppy 
production.  Hence,  when  perfect  credit  markets  are  available,  the 
eradication  policies  are  likely  to  have  the  intended  effect.  However,  if 
opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, the analytical results suggest 
that the outcome of an increased risk of eradication is no longer clear-cut: 
it will depend on how much opium is sold on futures markets and on the 
degree of risk aversion. If the farmers are sufficiently risk-averse and all 
opium poppy crops are sold prior to harvest, the land allocated to these 
crops  may  actually  increase.  The  analysis  also  indicates  that,  when  the 
opium poppy is grown in a sharecropping arrangement, the tenant will 
unambiguously suffer losses  from increased risk of  eradication; on the 
other hand, under some circumstances, the sharecropping landlord may 
actually benefit from increased risk of eradication. These results indicate 
that ignoring the role of opium in the rural market can lead to eradication 
policies having perverse outcomes. 
 
This paper relates to several strands of previous literature. Firstly, it relates 
to models of crime put forward in the seminal work by Becker (1968). In 
these models, crime is seen as an economic decision: a crime is committed 
if the expected utility of committing it outweighs the expected utility of 
using the resources in an alternative activity. Specifically this paper relates 
to the models of crime where the choice  of illegal crop production is 
addressed; in this regard the contributions by Ibanez (2007) and Clemens 
(2008)  are  notable.  Ibanez  (2007)  examines  the  economic  incentives 
surrounding  coca  production  in  Colombia.  She  presents  a  theoretical 
outline  where  farmers  choose  how  to  allocate  land  between  coca 4  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
production and legal crop production in an environment where there is a 
risk  of  coca  eradication.  In  her  empirical  analysis,  she  finds  that  the 
decision  of  whether  or  not  to  grow  coca  can  mainly  be  explained  by 
economic incentives, lack of options, poverty, moral considerations, social 
norms, legitimacy, and religious beliefs. Clemens (2008) estimates supply 
and demand elasticities for opium and simulates the equilibrium effects of 
eradication in Afghanistan. He finds that, in order to achieve even modest 
decreases in opium production, substantial increases in opium eradication 
are  needed  due  to  low  source-country  demand  elasticities.  However, 
neither Ibanez (2007) nor Clemens (2008) take into account that, if the 
illegal crop can be used as a means to obtain credit or is produced in 
sharecropping arrangements, this can affect the outcome of eradication 
policies.  
 
Secondly, this paper relates to the literature on sales of crop production in 
futures markets, where the first formalisation of the problem is presented 
by Stiglitz (1983).  
 
Finally, this paper also relates to the theoretical models of sharecropping 
(see e.g. Singh 2000 for an overview). Of special interest in this regard is 
the contribution by Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) and their result that, in 
a  sharecropping  arrangement,  a  landlord  may  actually  benefit  from 
resisting technological innovation if the improved technology leads to a 
sufficiently large negative supply response on behalf of the tenant. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to connect these different strands 
of literature in order to analyse the impacts of eradication policies, given 
the  economic  and  institutional  setting  facing  opium  farmers  in Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  5 
 
 
Afghanistan. The principal model developed in this paper is a version of 
Becker‟s  choice  between  legal  and  illegal  activities,  connected  with 
Stiglitz‟s  model  of  sales  of  an  uncertain  output  of  crops  on  a  futures 
market  on  the  one  hand,  and  Braverman  and  Stiglitz‟s  set-up  of  the 
sharecropping model on the other. Other aspects that influence the choice 
of illegal activities, such as social norms, morality, threats, violence and the 
legitimacy of authorities are left out of the analysis in order to keep the 
model as simple as possible.  
 
In the next section, section 2, the institutional setting is described. The 
focus is on how opium is used as a means of obtaining credit and the 
methods used to eradicate opium in Afghanistan. In section 3, we set up a 
number of theoretical models to study the outcome of opium eradication 
under  different  credit  and  land  tenure  systems.  In  section  3.1  we 
investigate how an increased risk of eradication affects the land allocated 
to  opium  poppy  crops  when  perfectly  functioning  credit  markets  are 
available. In section 3.2, we investigate how the land allocated to opium 
poppy crops is affected by an increased risk of eradication when opium is 
the only means of obtaining credit. In section 3.3, we investigate how the 
costs and benefits for landlords and tenants, respectively, are affected by 
an increased risk of eradication. The paper ends with a discussion of the 
results  of  these  investigations,  and  of  issues  that  are  left  for  future 
research. 6  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
2  Institutional setting
1 
 
Sales of crops on futures markets and the formation of sharecropping 
arrangements are features that are commonly associated with agricultural 
markets worldwide. Sales on futures markets give farmers the opportunity 
to  obtain  credit  and  insure  against  future  fluctuations  in  price,  while 
sharecropping arrangements give stakeholders an opportunity to share risk 
and  compensate  for  asymmetric  information.  In  areas  like  rural 
Afghanistan, where formal credit and insurance are lacking, these kinds of 
credit and land tenure systems are likely to be especially important as a 
means of insuring against risk and smoothing consumption over time. 
 
The opium poppy has, due to a number of specific features, come to play 
an important role in these markets of advance sales and sharecropping 
arrangements. The characteristics that make opium different from many 
other crops are that it – 
  has a high value 
  is light in weight, which makes it easy to transport from remote 
areas 
  is non-perishable, which makes it easy to store 
  is not as sensitive to local pests as many other crops 
  can be grown at high altitudes, and 
  is highly labour-intensive. 
                                                       
1 This section draws heavily on the work of David Mansfield (see e.g. Mansfield, 2003; 
2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007), a leading expert in opium eradication strategies, as well as 
on reports produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and 
the Afghan Research Evaluation Unit. For obvious reasons, few field studies in this area 
have been made and more research is needed in order to have a better picture of the 
market structure surrounding opium crop production in Afghanistan. Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  7 
 
 
The fact that opium is easy to store and transport is likely to make it an 
attractive crop on which advances can be given, as this allows the buyer to 
spread risk between regions and over time. This characteristic is likely to 
be especially attractive, considering that many of the other markets for 
agricultural  production  in  Afghanistan  are  likely  to  be  shallow,  which 
makes the risk for a local supplier of credit on future crop sales extremely 
high.  This  assumption  seems  to  be  confirmed  in  the  field.  Mansfield 
(2003) finds that, in opium-growing areas, lenders prefer to give advances 
on opium poppy rather than other crops. The high labour intensity in 
opium  cultivation  is  also  likely  to  make  sharecropping  an  attractive 
arrangement as regards land tenure, as costs associated with monitoring 
wage labour would be high. This is in line with Mansfield (2004), who 
concludes that opium plays an important role as a means for poor farmers 
to gain access to land: sharecroppers who are willing to grow opium are 
given preferential treatment by landlords. 
 
In  Afghanistan,  agricultural  credit  known  as  salaam  is  usually  given 
through  a  system  of  advance  sales  of  future  harvests.  The  system  is 
essentially that farmers sell their crops prior to harvest, often at a price 
that  is  significantly  lower  than  the  market  price.  Once  the  crop  is 
harvested, it is delivered to the lenders, who can resell it at a higher price 
on  the  market.  Mansfield  (2003)  reports  that,  for  many  resource-poor 
farmers, advance sales of opium are their only means of obtaining credit 
during the winter season. It is also reported that many of these resource-
poor  farmers  sell  their  entire  crop  prior  to  harvest  in  order  to  cover 
consumption needs and to buy agricultural inputs. The market structure 
surrounding opium-based salaam seems to differ from one geographical 
location to another. A field study of farm-gate opium traders (UNODC, 8  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
1998) found that, in eastern Afghanistan, salaam was usually provided by 
shopkeepers; in the southern regions, salaam was provided by a range of 
different intermediaries in the opium trade. Generally, it seems that the 
opium trade in southern Afghanistan is more open and „legitimate‟, and is 
characterised by numerous buyers and sellers. In the eastern and central 
provinces of Afghanistan, on the other hand, the opium trade seems to be 
more centralised, with fewer traders (Pain, 2006; UNODC, 1998). 
 
As is always the case with advance sales, there is a risk that the opium is 
never delivered to the lender, e.g. due to crop failures, eradication, or 
moral hazards. To limit the risk of default, salaam has often been found to 
be  restricted  to  farmers  that  the  lenders  know  (UNODC,  1998).  As 
regards the outcome when farmers are unable to deliver the opium, this is 
likely to differ from case to case. Lenders have reported that they either 
permit farmers to delay the delivery of opium until the following season 
(but then demand a higher amount), or they claim the loan amount back 
in  cash  within  the  same  season  (UNODC,  1998).  Irrespective  of  the 
timing of the repayment, farmers have reported that, in order to cope with 
an opium-denominated debt, they use a number of strategies ranging from 
the sale or mortgaging of their land, to the marriage of their daughters 
(Mansfield,  2006b).  Opium-denominated  debt  is  often  mentioned  as  a 
driving force behind continued opium cultivation. 
 
However,  and  of  relevance  to  our  modelling,  the  risk  of  undelivered 
opium also seems to be reflected in the advance price of opium received 
by the farmers. The dynamics of the price of opium-based salaam and the 
risk of opium poppy eradication can be seen in the patterns discerned 
through a series of field studies known as the Driver Studies (Mansfield, Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  9 
 
 
2003; 2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007). In these studies, farmers‟ plans on 
what crops to grow during the season ahead as well as the underlying 
reasons for these plans were examined. In the first Driver Study, a large 
share2  of the  respondents had obtained opium -based salaam. In these 
deals, the price for the opium sold in advance was usually set to half the 
current market price. In the second Driver Study , the authors concluded 
that the futures market system seemed to have been  put under pressure 
due to a fear of opium poppy eradication. They based this finding on the 
fact that the share of respondents who had taken this kind of credit had 
declined dramatically.3 The authors also  reported that the advance price 
had fallen to 30–40% of the prevailing market price for those farmers who 
owned no land and, therefore, had been considered less creditworthy.4 
 
In  respect  of  t he  eradication  strategies  themselves,  their  content  in 
Afghanistan  has  varied  over  the  years.  The  current  program me  was 
launched in  2004 and is based on forced eradication. Today, all opium 
eradication in the country is led by the Central Poppy Eradication Force 
(CPEF) and the Afghan National Police (AP) . The  methods used are 
mainly destruction by tractor, stick, animal plough , or all-terrain vehicles 
(UNODC, 2009)5. Thus, unlike the eradication policies pursued against 
coca farming in parts of Latin America,  for example, the  eradication of 
                                                       
2 Ranging from 63% in Nangahar to 16% in Badakhshan. 
3 Only 5% of the respondents in the total sample. 
4  For a comprehensive review of the literature and the linkages between opium and 
informal credit, see Pain (2008). 
5 At the international level, counternarcotic supply control strategies in source countries 
fall  into  four  broad  categories:  eradication,  alternative  development,  in -country 
enforcement,  and  interdiction.  Alternative  development  refers  to  development  of  new 
alternative income sources that are financially attractive for the farmer. In-country enforcement 
targets  refineries,  stocks  and  business  dealings.  Finally,  interdiction  targets  international 
trafficking and smuggling operations (Paoli et al., 2009). 10  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
opium will only affect the opium crop per se and will not affect other 
crops  grown  on  nearby  land.    This  factor  simplifies  our  subsequent 
modelling considerably. 
 
3  Theoretical models 
 
In the following subsections, we investigate the effects of the eradication 
policy  under  different  credit  and  land  tenure  systems  in  a  number  of 
theoretical  models.  In  section  3.1,  the  effects  of  an  increased  risk  of 
opium eradication  on farmers‟ crop choices is examined in a situation 
when  credit  markets  are  perfectly  available  and  the  farmer  can  freely 
decide how to allocate land to different crops. Section 3.2 presents an 
analysis of whether these effects are altered when the only way to obtain 
credit is through sales of opium on a futures market through the salaam 
system.  Section  3.3  presents  an  investigation  into  how  an  eradication 
strategy affects landowners‟ profits and utility for tenants when opium is 
produced in a sharecropping arrangement. 
 
3.1  Baseline: Perfect capital markets and rented land 
 
Assume  that  a  farmer  derives  utility  from  consumption  in  two  time 
periods according to the following: 
 
    (1) 
 
where   is consumption in time period i = 1, 2, and   is a discount factor. 
It  also  assumed  that  the  farmer  can  produce  two  goods:  opium  and 
another agricultural good. The only factor of crop production is land, L, Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  11 
 
 
which is fixed,6 but it can be allocated freely  to production of the two 
goods. The rental cost of land  is given by the price  w. The production 
functions for opium and the other agricultural good can then respectively 
be written as   and  .  
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the farmers face a risk that the opium 
crop production will be eradicated. Hence, the actual outcome of the such 
production is given as  , where  with probability  , and 
with probability . The price of opium is given by   and the price of 
the  other  agricultural  good  is  normalised  to 1.  The  production  and 
consumption decisions are assumed to be made at the beginning of the 
first period, and production realised in the second period.  In the first 
period, the farmer can borrow at the interest rate r. Assuming that s/he 
borrows  , consumption in the second period is then given as follows: 
 
    (2) 
 
Hence, the farmer is assumed to choose how to allocate land between the 
two  activities  and  consumption  between  the  time  periods  in  order  to 






                                                       
6 Owing to the fractured character of the Afghan countryside, with small plots of arable 
soil surrounded by rocky, untillable land, in practice the sizes of plots are often fixed by 
natural factors. 12  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
where U is the utility of consumption. It is also assumed that the utility 
function is concave, meaning that   and    The 
utility in the second period differs according to good or bad outcomes. To 
distinguish between the different outcomes, we denote 
,  i.e.  the  utility  from  second-period  consumption 
when  the  opium  has  not  been  eradicated,  and 
,  i.e.  the  utility  from  second-period  consumption  when  the 
opium has been eradicated. As the income is larger in the former case, it 
follows that   
 





  0  (5) 
 
Equation (4) implies that, in optimum, the marginal utility of consumption 
in the first period is equal to the mean of the expected utility across the 
different states in the second period, weighted by the interest rate and the 
discount rate. This is an expected result, but it is mentioned here as it will 
be used as a point of reference in future models.  Equation (5) can be 
reorganised to yield the following: 
 
    (6) 
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This  implies  that,  in  optimum,  because  of  farmers‟  risk  aversion,  the 
expected marginal revenue product of land is always higher for opium 
poppy than for the other agricultural good. To derive the effect of an 
increased  risk  of  eradication,  we  totally  differentiate  the  first-order 
conditions and use Cramer‟s rule (for a more detailed description of the 






where   is the Hessian determinant, which is positive from the second 
order conditions for maximisation. The signs of the numerators in the 
first  and second  terms are both negative. Hence, if  the system has  an 
interior solution, then  . 
 
Thus, if a risk-averse farmer chooses how to allocate land between opium 
poppy  and  another  agricultural  good,  and  perfect  credit  markets  are 
available, an increased risk of eradication will unambiguously reduce the 
land allocated to opium poppy. This result is intuitive and in line with 
expectations.  Hence,  under  perfectly  functioning  credit  markets, 
eradication  is  likely  to  have  the  intended  effects  of  reducing  or  even 
eliminating opium poppy production. An important thing to note here is 
that, as it is assumed that all opium is lost in the case of eradication, there 
is no reason for the farmer to a priori increase the production of opium 
poppy crops to compensate for income losses in the bad state in the case 14  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
of an increased risk of eradication. We now turn to the case when credit is 
obtained through advanced sales of opium. 
 
3.2  Imperfect capital markets and rented land 
 
In this subsection, we model a situation where there are no formal credit 
markets  available  to  the  farmer,  and  the  only  way  to  obtain  credit  is 
through sales of opium on a futures market. Throughout this section, a 
number of assumptions need to be made about the lender and the market 
in which s/he operates. In this paper we assume, for simplicity, that the 
lender is risk-neutral and operates in a fully competitive market. 
 
We  also need to make assumptions about what happens if the opium 
poppy is eradicated before it is delivered to the lender. In this case, there 
are at least three possible ways to make the market clear in a two-period 
setting.  The  first  option  is  that  the  borrower  always  pays  back  the 
borrowed amount to the lender. Given the above assumptions, this would 
imply  that  lenders  face  no  increased  risk  due  to  eradication,  and  the 
advance price of opium differs from the harvest price only by the interest 
rate. This scenario leads us to the baseline model described above. The 
second option is to assume that, if eradication occurs, there is no way for 
the lender to get the borrowed money back. If this risk is anticipated by 
the lender at the time of providing the loan, the risk of eradication will be 
fully reflected in the advance price received on the opium. This would 
imply that the farmer „pays‟ for the eradication through the lower advance 
price. The third option is a mixed case: the farmer pays back as much as 
possible in the second period, but this is not sufficient to repay the full Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  15 
 
 
loan.  In  this  case  scenario,  the  risk  of  eradication  will  also  be  partly 
reflected in the opium‟s advance price. 
 
In the models presented below, we follow the second option and assume 
that the risk of eradication is fully reflected in the advance price. 
 
Now let us turn to the formulation of the lender‟s optimisation problem. 
We assume that, in the first period, i.e. prior to harvest, the farmer has the 
opportunity to sell opium to a lender at the price   In the second period, 
the opium can be sold at a fixed price . This price is assumed to be set 
on a world market that is sufficiently large not to be influenced by the risk 
of  eradication;  for  simplicity‟s  sake,  this  price  is  assumed  to  be  non-
stochastic. As it is assumed that the lender operates on a fully competitive 
market, the expected present value of the lender‟s profit is 0, and there is 
no  way  for  the  lender  to  reclaim  his  money  in  case  of  opium  poppy 
eradication, the lender‟s expected profit can be written as follows: 
 
    (8) 
 
where    is  the  opium  bought  by  the  lender.  A  rearrangement  of 
equation (8) gives: 
 
    (9) 
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Equation (9) implies that if the risk of eradication,  increases, the price 
of  opium  in  the  first  period  decreases.  This  result  is  in  line  with  the 
findings in Mansfield (2004).  
 
The model presented above could be seen as special case of a broader 
model where the lender has a limited amount of liquid assets to use on 
purchases of futures on different kinds of agricultural production. The 
special case would then occur when the profitability in advance purchases 
of opium is higher for every unit of opium bought in advance, compared 
with advance purchases of other crops. 
 
Now let us turn to the farmer‟s optimisation problem. Assume that the 
farmer sells   units of opium in advance to buy   units of the other 
agricultural good. This means that the budget constraint in the first period 
is given by the following: 
 
    (10) 
 
In the second period, there are two possible outcomes for the farmer. If 
no  eradication  occurs,  s/he  can  consume  what  s/he  receives  for  the 
remaining  opium  crop  production  and  the  production  of  the  other 
agricultural good, minus the land rental cost, expressed as follows: 
 
    (11) 
 
By inserting (9) and (10) into (11), the above expression can be rewritten 




    (12) 
 
In  the second possible  outcome  for  the  farmer, namely  i f  eradication 
occurs, the second-period consumption is given by the following: 
 
  (13) 
 






w.r.t.   and  .  
 
It should be noted that, as long as  , the farmer is 
overcommitted,  in  the  sense  that  s/he  sells  more  than  the  expected 
output. We assume that there is a limit for overcommitment, in that the 
farmer can never sell more of his opium poppy crop than he plants. This 
can be thought of as a situation where the lender and the farmer operate 
in the same village, so there is no option to sell more opium in advance 
than what is actually planted. The overcommitment constraint implies that 
the following inequality must then hold: 
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    (15) 
 
The solution to the model will differ depending on whether or not the 
overcommitment constraint is binding. In Case 1 (see 3.2.1 below), we 
look at the model when the constraint is binding; in Case 2 (see 3.2.2 
below), we look at the model when the constraint is not binding. We end 
this subsection with Case 3 (see 3.2.3 below), where it is assumed that the 
first-period consumption is restricted to a minimum level of consumption 
and, therefore, is totally inelastic. 
 
3.2.1  Case 1 
 
In  Case  1,  the  entire  opium  crop  produced  is  sold  in  advance.  As 
mentioned  in  section  2,  previous  field  studies  have  found  that  many 
Afghan farmers sell their entire opium crop prior to harvest in order to 
meet their consumption needs during the winter months. Hence, for some 
farmers, the assumption of an advanced sale of all opium crops seems 
reasonable.  
 
In this case, an increased risk of eradication only enters the utility function 
through the advance price, since all of the opium is already sold when the 
potential eradication occurs; hence, there is no stochasticity in the utility 
function. The utility function can be written as follows: 
 
    (16) 
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which is maximised w.r.t.  . The first-order condition can then be written 
as follows: 
    (17) 
 
From equation (17), it follows that the marginal rate of substitution of 
consumption in the two time periods,  , is equal to the marginal rate of 
technical transformation in the production of the two crops,  , weighted 
by the relative price of consumption in each time period,  . Total 
differentiation of equation (17) gives the following: 
 
 








    (19) 
 
The  denominator  in  equation  (19)  is  negative  from  the  second-order 
condition for maximisation. The numerator can be rewritten as: 
,  where  ,  can  be  seen  as  a  measure  of  relative  risk 20  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
aversion. Thus, the sign of equation (19) will depend on the degree of risk 
aversion. 
 
Proposition  1:  If  a  risk-averse  farmer  sells  his  entire  opium  crop  in 
advance on a competitive market where the lenders fully anticipate that 
some of the crop production will be eradicated, the effect of an increased 
eradication will depend on the degree of risk aversion. Thus, –  
  if R  , increased risk of eradication will lead to a reduction in the 
land allocated to opium poppy. 
  if R , increased risk of eradication will lead to an increase in the 
land allocated to opium poppy.  
 
Thus,  in  optimum,  there  are  basically  two  contradicting  forces  at  play 
when the risk of eradication increases and the advance price of opium 
declines. One direct effect works in the direction of lowered opium poppy 
production. This can be seen as a substitution effect, where the reduced 
profitability of opium crop production draws resources away from such 
production. There is also an indirect effect that works in the direction of 
increased production. This can be seen as an income effect that stems 
from the fact that, to maintain the same level of consumption in the first 
period, more resources need to be allocated to opium crop production. 
The net outcome of these two effects will depend on the degree of the 
farmer‟s risk aversion. If the farmer‟s risk aversion is low, the optimal 
response is to reduce the amount of land allocated to opium crops; if the 
degree  of  risk  aversion  is  sufficiently  high,  the  farmer  will  insure 
himself/herself  against  income  losses  by  increasing  the  production  of 
opium. This is interesting: it implies that the more risk-averse the farmer Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  21 
 
 
is, the more likely s/he is to act contrary to policymakers‟ intentions when 
the risk of eradication increases. 
 
3.2.2  Case 2 
 
In Case 2, the farmer keeps some of the opium to be sold after harvest at 
the  price  that  is  higher  than  the  advance  price.  This  implies  that  the 
expected utility function is given by equation (14). This situation can be 
seen as a combination of the two previous models described above: the 
opium that is kept for sale after harvest is directly subject to the risk of 
eradication, and the opium that is sold in advance is only affected by 
eradication  through  the  price  effect.  The  first-order  conditions  in  this 
model are given by the following: 
 
 
  (20) 
 
 
  (21) 
 
Note that the difference between equation (20) and equation (4) is that the 
trade-off in consumption is now only between the first period and the 
„good‟ outcome in the second period.  
 
Total differentiation and Cramer‟s rule (see Appendix B for details) give 
the following: 





Here, R is defined as   and can again be seen as a measure of 
relative risk aversion. As before,   is the Hessian determinant, which is 
positive  from  the  second-order  conditions  for  maximisation.  The 
numerator second term is negative, while the numerator in the first term 
will depend on the degree of risk aversion. Hence, if the farmer‟s risk 
aversion is low, increased eradication will lead to lower levels of opium 
crop  production;  if  the  risk  aversion  is  sufficiently  high,  the  effect  is 
ambiguous. 
 
Proposition 2: If a risk-averse farmer sells some of the produced opium 
in advance on a competitive market where the lenders fully anticipate that 
some of the crop production will be eradicated, the effect of an increased 
eradication will depend on the degree of risk aversion. Thus, – 
  if  , increased risk of eradication will lead to a reduction in 
the land allocated to opium poppy. 
  if  ,  the  effect  of  increased  risk of  eradication  on  land 
allocated to opium poppy production is ambiguous. 
 
Thus, when some opium is kept for sales after harvest, the outcome is 
similar to that when all opium is sold in advance. The outcome in Case 2 
differs from Case 1 only in respect of the indeterminate outcome in the Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  23 
 
 
event of high risk aversion. As the opium that is kept for selling after the 
harvest  is  directly  subject  to  the  risk,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
substitution effect is relatively stronger in Case 2. 
 
3.2.3  Case 3 
 
We now turn to the special case when first-period consumption is totally 
inelastic. This could be thought of as a situation where the farmer is at 
borderline starvation levels of consumption in the first period, and only 
produces the amount of opium necessary to meet this consumption level. 







where   is the minimum level of necessary consumption. 
 
Total differentiation then gives the following: 
 





  (25) 
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Proposition 3: If the farmer‟s first-period consumption is restricted by a 
minimum subsistence level, an increased risk of eradication will lead to an 
increase in the land allocated to opium crop production.  
 
The intuition behind this result is that if the price of opium goes down 
and  the  farmer  cannot  reduce  his  consumption  further,  s/he  has  no 
choice but to grow more opium. This result is reasonable as long as the 
risk  of  eradication  is  sufficiently  low;  if  the  risk  of  eradication  is 
sufficiently high, however, lenders are likely to provide advances on other 
crops instead. 
 
3.3  Imperfect capital markets and sharecropping 
arrangements  
 
We now shift focus and study the effects of eradication when opium is 
produced in a sharecropping arrangement. Instead of paying a land rental 
cost, the tenant shares the agricultural output with the landlord. In section 
3.3.1, we study a situation where the tenant decides what share of the land 
to allocate to opium poppy crops and another agricultural product. In 
section 3.3.2, we study a situation where the landlord has already decided 
that opium will be grown on a specific plot. These can be seen as extreme 
cases. In reality, the decisions on which crops to grow, and what shares to 
allocate to these crops, are likely to be determined through negotiations.   
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3.3.1   Tenant decides land allocation 
 
In this section we use the same models as described in sections 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2,  but  assume  that  instead  of  a  land  rental  cost,  the  output  share 
received by the tenant is denoted by   and the output share received by 
the  landlord  is  denoted  by . For  simplicity,  we  assume  that  the 
shares are exogenous and set by cultural norms or tradition. The tenant‟s 






As long as the  shares received from opium and the other agricultural 
product  are  the  same,  the  optimal  solution  as  well  as  the  effect  of 
eradication on land allocated to opium poppy production are analogous to 
those in the models described above. Note that, in optimum, the change 
in the tenant‟s utility caused by a change in the risk of eradication is given 
by the following: 
 
 
  (27) 
 
As the income is always larger in the no-eradication outcome, it follows 
that  . Thus, the expected utility of the tenant will always decrease 
when the risk of eradication increases. 
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But what outcome can the landlord expect? The landlord is assumed to 
maximise the expected profit rather than the expected utility. The present 
value of the expected profit will be given by the following: 
 
 
  (28) 
 









The first term in equation (2 9) is negative, while the second  is 
indeterminate.7  Hence,  the  effect  on  the  landlords  profit  from  an 
increased risk of eradication is ambiguous.  
 
Proposition 4: Given the assumptions made in section 3.3.1, an increased 
risk of opium poppy eradication will always lead to lower expected utility 
for the tenant. However, the effect of increased risk of eradication on the 
landlord‟s expected profit is ambiguous. 
                                                       
7 In model 3.2.1,   is either positive or negative depending on the tenant‟s degree 
of risk aversion while the sign of    is ambiguous, which can be seen 
from equation (17) when reorganised to yield . In model 3.2.2, 
 is either negative or indeterminate depending on the tenant‟s degree of risk 
aversion while the sign of    is positive, which can be seen from 
equation (21) when reorganised to yield . Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  27 
 
 
3.3.2  Cultivation of opium poppy decided in advance 
 
In this model, we assume that the landlord has already decided that only 
opium poppy crops should be grown on a specific plot. For simplicity‟s 
sake, we assume that the tenant sells his/her entire share in advance, while 
the landlord‟s share is sold after the harvest. We also assume that the only 
thing that the tenant can choose in this model is how much effort, e, to 
put into production. This is in order to have some choice variable for the 
tenant; otherwise, the problem would become trivial. The income received 
by the tenant is then given by the following: 
 
 
  (30) 
 
where   and  . Assuming that the utility function is additively 
separable, the expected utility function is given as follows: 
 
 
  (31) 
 
where  is the utility of consumption and   is the disutility of effort. 
It is  assume that  ,  ,    and  .  The  first-order 
condition can then be written as follows: 
 
  = 0  (32) 
   





   
Reorganising equation (33) gives the following: 
 
 
  (34) 
 
where   is a measure of the relative risk aversion. Hence, the 
effect of eradication will depend on the degree of risk aversion. If R > 1, 
an increased risk of opium poppy eradication leads to more effort being 
directed  towards  opium poppy  production.  Note,  again,  that  increased 
opium eradication will always reduce the expected utility of the tenant,  
i.e. – 
 
  (35) 
 
The landlord‟s expected present-value profit can be described as follows: 
 
 
  (36) 
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while  the  change  in  profit  from  an  increased  risk  of  opium  poppy 
eradication can be given by the following: 
 
 
  (37) 
 
Hence,  again,  the  effect  of  an  increased  risk  of  eradication  on  the 
landlords profit is ambiguous. If an increased risk of opium eradication 
leads  to  an  increased  effort  by  the  tenant,  and  the  effort  response  is 
sufficient to offset the lower expected output, the landlord may actually 
benefit from increased eradication. If this is the case, the increased risk of 
eradication creates no incentive for the landlord to switch production to 
other agricultural crops in subsequent periods. 
 
Proposition 5: Given the assumptions made in section 3.3.2, an increased 
risk of opium poppy eradication will always lead to lower expected utility 
for the tenant. However, the effect of increased risk of eradication on the 
landlord‟s expected profit is ambiguous and will depend on the tenant‟s 
degree of risk aversion. For low levels of risk aversion, the landlord will 
lose; but if the tenant is sufficiently risk-averse, the landlord may actually 
benefit from increased risk of eradication. 
 
4  Discussion 
 
The eradication of opium poppy is highly controversial. Critics argue that 
the effect is limited and the human costs are high, while advocates argue 
that eradication  is an important instrument for reducing opium  poppy 
cultivation. To offer some insight into this debate, this paper investigated 30  Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies? 
how  the  role  of  opium  in  the  rural  economy  affects  the  outcome  of 
eradication policies. As this paper is the first attempt to model the opium 
farmer‟s  decision  problem,  we  have  used  quite  simple  assumptions 
throughout.  For  example,  we  have  assumed  risk-neutral  lenders  who 
operate in a fully competitive market. The realism in this assumption can 
be  questioned;  future  research  should  explore  if  the  results  change  if 
lenders are assumed to be risk-averse, or if the lending market is assumed 
to be less than perfectly competitive. However, despite the simplicity of 
the  model,  it  still  gives  some  important  insights  into  the  underlying 
mechanisms at stake. 
 
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that, when perfect credit 
markets are available, an increased risk of eradication will lead to lower 
levels of opium poppy production. Hence, if credit markets were available, 
the eradication strategy would be likely to have the intended effect of 
lowering production. However, the assumption of perfect credit markets 
is likely to be unrealistic in rural Afghanistan. In this paper, we try to build 
a  model that  incorporates some of  the  aspects  of  Afghanistan‟s  credit 
market and, especially, the role of opium in this context. A number of 
field  studies  have  found  that,  in  opium  poppy  crop-growing  areas  in 
Afghanistan, cultivation has become an important way to obtain credit; 
for poor farmers, it is even sometimes the only way. It has also been 
found that many of the farmers sell their entire crop production prior to 
harvest to obtain credit for covering consumption needs during the winter 
season. The price received from these advance sales of opium seems to 
reflect the risk of eradication: the higher the risk of eradication, the lower 
the price that the farmer obtains on the advance sale. 
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When these aspects are taken into consideration, the results of this study 
indicate that the outcome of eradication policies are no longer clear-cut, 
but will depend on the degree of risk aversion. The higher the degree of 
risk aversion and the more opium that is sold in advance, the more likely it 
is  that  the  eradication  is  counterproductive.  This  is  something  that  is 
worth reflecting on when future counternarcotic strategies are designed. 
 
Another  aspect  of  Afghanistan‟s  rural  market  is  that  of  sharecropping 
arrangements.  The  results  from  this  study  suggest  that,  if  the  tenants‟ 
effort response is sufficiently large, the landlord may actually benefit from 
an increased risk of eradiation and thus, the landlord will have no interest 
in reduced opium poppy production. If this is the case, and landlords are 
influential in the villages, the scope of reducing opium by eradication is 
limited.  
 
Eradication  policies  would  be  straightforward  and  have  the  intended 
effects  on  farmers‟  incentives  if  credit  markets  and  land  markets 
functioned perfectly. If we remember that such perfection is not realistic, 
even our simple models indicate that the outcomes from eradication are 
difficult to predict.  
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Total differentiation of the first-order condition described in (4) and (5) 
gives the following expression: 
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To understand how an increased risk of eradication, , affects the land 




where the determinant is positive from the second-order conditions for 





Total differentiation of the first-order condition described in (14) and (15) 
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The use of Cramer‟s rule gives the following: 
 
 
 